• Problem: Such 'easy' cases are few and far between.
What of all the interesting 'hard' cases?
• Claim: In a hard case, the entity's nature allows us to reduce to easy cases.
T : For each nonfundamental x, there is a logically complex entity (x) which (i) speci es the nature of x and (ii) provides groundingconditions for x. N / x: What it is for x to be the very thing it is (individual essence); or to be the very kind of thing it is (kind essence).
G
x: Conditions specifying all the possible grounds for x's existence and, when x is a property, also specifying all the possible grounds for something's possessing x.
Real De nition
• Speci es what the object is (Fine ; Lowe ) • Speci es the essence of x.
• C : 'is directly de nitive of the object' (Fine , ) Formal Constitution 
A Puzzle about Parthood
• Mereological summation x ⊔ y de ned as that thing which has x and y (and all their parts), and nothing else, as parts.
• This is the real de nition of x ⊔ y. Consequence: of the nature of x ⊔ y to have x as a part.
• Tables do not have their material parts essentially. • So, tables are not mereological sums of their material parts.
• Matter (e.g. that mass of clay) has its parts essentially.
(Else, it would be some other mass of clay.)
• But statues don't have material parts essentially: the statue could have had some other material constitution.
F P :
• Being unmarried is a (formal) part of being a bachelor
• ⟨A⟩ is a (formal) part of ⟨A ∧ B⟩
• ⟨A⟩'s truth is a (formal) part of ⟨A ∧ B⟩'s truth.
• F is a (formal) part of ⟨Fa⟩
• ⟨A⟩ is about x iff x is a formal part of ⟨A⟩ (??)
The Language of Reality
• Formal constitution of x = essence of x = a logically complex entity. (Nb: logical constructions, but not in a purely linguistic sense.)
• Q: what is a logically complex entity? How do logical modes on construction work?
• I accept logically complex states of affairs (Barker and Jago ).
• Complex properties as abstractions from complex states (Jago )
• States as worldly closed sentences; properties as worldly open sentences.
• Q: must there be primitive non-logical vocab? A 'fundamental level'? This theory doesn't require it.
Natures as Constructions
• Natures = de nitions written in the worldly language.
• Natures, not material entities, are constituents of other natures.
• Natures are necessary beings, whereas material entities are not.
M : de ning abstract entities via a relational open sentence, qua pure structure (i.e., minus the de ned entities).
L
' O : "if the essence of an entity were just some further entity, then it in turn would have to have an essence of its own and we would be faced with an in nite regress" (Lowe , -) • For immaterial entities x, (x) = x.
• For material entities x, (x) ≠ x.
• But if x is material, (x) is immaterial, hence ( (x)) = (x). Either way, no regress.
P G
• When x 1 , x 2 , . . . together ground y, each x i is a partial ground of y.
• Notation: x i ⪯ y.
• Analysis: consider y's real def in negation normal form. Then x ⪯ y when x has a +ve occurrence; (¬x) ⪯ y when x has a −ve occurrence.
Causal & Functional Roles
• Suppose pain = causal role R, typically taking bodily damage to certain types of behaviour.
• Causal roles are nonfundamental entities: open sentences in the worldly language.
• What makes it a causal role?
• One answer: realism about dispositional tendency.
• This is what α 1 's tending to β 1 and α 2 's tending to β 2 have in common.
• Provides worldly language with causal vocab.
The Shape of Grounding
• On this theory, grounding is irre exive, asymmetrical, & transitive.
• Open Q whether it is well-founded.
A R D
• Real de nitions cannot be circular, so de ned entities cannot be involved in grounding-loops.
• Non-circularity is a metaphysical, not an epistemic, condition on de nition.
A C
• If x ⪯ x then x ⊏ (x), hence x is nonmaterial.
• But then (x) = x and hence x ⊏ x, which is impossible.
Conclusion
M a formal & a material constitution: their nature & their matter. Nonmaterial entities are identical to their natures. Natures are worldly real de nitions specifying possible grounds. Grounding is irre exive, asymmetrical, and transitive; but it need not be well-founded.
